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Abstract 
 
The concept of randomness has been unjustly neglected in recent philosophical 
literature, and when philosophers have thought about it, they have usually acquiesced 
in views about the concept that are fundamentally flawed. After indicating the ways in 
which these accounts are flawed, I propose that randomness is to be understood as a 
special case of the epistemic concept of the unpredictability of a process. This 
proposal arguably captures the intuitive desiderata for the concept of randomness; at 
least it should suggest that the commonly accepted accounts cannot be the whole story 
and more philosophical attention needs to be paid. 
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[R]andomness [...] is going to be a concept which is relative to our body of 
knowledge, which will somehow reflect what we know and what we don’t know. 
HENRY E. KYBURG, JR. ([1974], p. 217) 
 
Phenomena that we cannot predict must be judged random. 
PATRICK SUPPES ([1984], p. 32) 
 
The concept of randomness has been sadly neglected in the recent philosophical 
literature. As with any topic of philosophical dispute, it would be foolish to conclude 
from this neglect that the truth about randomness has been established. Quite the 
contrary: the views about randomness in which philosophers currently acquiesce are 
fundamentally mistaken about the nature of the concept. Moreover, since randomness 
plays a significant role in the foundations of a number of scientific theories and 
methodologies, the consequences of this mistaken view are potentially quite serious. 
After I briefly outline the scientific roles of randomness, I will survey the false views 
that currently monopolise philosophical thinking about randomness. I then make my 
own positive proposal, not merely as a contribution to the correct understanding of the 
concept, but also hopefully prompting a renewal of philosophical attention to 
randomness. 
The view I defend, that randomness is unpredictability, is not entirely without 
precedent in the philosophical literature. As can be seen from the epigraphs I quoted 
at the beginning of this paper, the connection between the two concepts has made an 
appearance before.1 These quotations are no more than suggestive however: these 
authors were aware that there is some kind of intuitive link, but made no efforts to 
give any rigorous development of either concept in order that we might see how and 
why randomness and prediction are so closely related. Indeed, the Suppes quotation is 
quite misleading: he adopts exactly the pernicious hypothesis I discuss below (§3.2), 
and takes determinism to characterise predictability—so that what he means by his 
apparently friendly quotation is exactly the mistaken view I oppose! Correspondingly, 
the third objective I have in this paper is to give a plausible and defensible 
characterisation of the concept of predictability, in order that we might give 
philosophical substance and content to this intuition that randomness and 
predictability have something or other to do with one another.2 
 
1 Randomness in Science 
 
The concept of randomness occurs in a number of different scientific contexts. If we 
are to have any hope of giving a philosophical concept of randomness that is adequate 
to the scientific uses, we must pay some attention to the varied guises in which 
randomness comes. 
All of the following examples are in some sense derivative from the most 
central and crucial appearance of randomness in science—randomness as a 
prerequisite for the applicability of probabilistic theories. Von Mises was well aware 
of the centrality of this role; he made randomness part of his definition of probability. 
This association of randomness with von Mises’ hypothetical frequentism has 
unfortunately meant that interest in randomness has declined with the fortunes of that 
interpretation of probability. As I mentioned, this decline was hastened by the 
widespread belief that randomness can be explained merely as indeterminism. Both of 
these factors have lead to the untimely neglect of randomness as a centrally important 
concept for understanding a number of issues, among them being the ontological 
force of probabilistic theories, the criteria and grounds for acceptance of theories, and 
how we might evaluate the strength of various proposals concerning statistical 
inference. Especially when one considers the manifest inadequacies of ontic accounts 
of randomness when dealing with these issues (§2), the neglect of the concept of 
randomness seems to have left a significant gap in the foundations of probability. We 
should, however, be wary of associating worries about randomness too closely with 
issues in the foundations of probability—those are only one aspect of the varied 
scientifically important uses of the concept. By paying attention to the use of the 
concept, hopefully we can begin to construct an adequate account that genuinely plays 
the role required by science. 
 
1.1 Random Systems 
 
Many dynamical processes are modelled probabilistically. These are processes which 
are modelled by probabilistic state transitions.3 Paradigm examples include the way 
that present and future states of the weather are related, state transitions in 
thermodynamics and between macroscopic partitions of classical statistical 
mechanical systems, and many kinds of probabilistic modelling. Examples from 
‘chaos theory’ have been particularly prominent recently (Smith, [1998]). 
For example, in ecohydrology (Rodriguez-Iturbe, [2000]), the key concept is 
the soil water balance at a point within the rooting depth of local plants. The 
differential equations governing the dynamics of this water balance relate the rates of 
rainfall, infiltration (depending on soil porosity and past soil moisture content), 
evapotranspiration and leakage (Laio et al., [2001]; Rodriguez-Iturbe et al., [1999]). 
The occurrence and amount of rainfall are random inputs.4 The details are interesting, 
but for our purposes the point to remember is that the randomness of the rainfall input 
is important in explaining the robust structure of the dynamics of soil moisture. 
Particular predictions of particular soil moisture based on particular volumes of 
rainfall are not nearly as important for this project as understanding the responses of 
soil types to a wide range of rainfall regimes. 
 
The robust probabilistic structures that emerge from low-level random phenomena are 
crucial to the task of explaining and predicting how such systems evolve over time 
and what consequences their structure has for the systems that depend on soil 
moisture, for example, plant communities.5 
Similar dynamical models of other aspects of the natural world, including 
convection currents in the atmosphere, the movement of leaves in the wind, and the 
complexities of human behaviour, are also successfully modelled as processes driven 
by random inputs. But the simplest examples are humble gaming devices like coins 
and dice. Such processes are random if anything is: the sequence of outcomes of 
heads and tails of a tossed coin exhibits disorder, and our best models of the 
behaviour of such phenomena are very simple probabilistic models. 
At the other extreme is the appearance of randomness in the outcomes of 
systems of our most fundamental physics: quantum mechanical systems. Almost all of 
the interpretations of quantum mechanics must confront the randomness of 
experimental outcomes with respect to macroscopic variables of interest; many 
account for such randomness by positing a  fundamental random process. For 
instance, collapse theories propose a fundamental stochastic collapse of the wave 
function onto a particular determinate measurement state, whether mysteriously 
induced by an observer (Wigner, [1961]), or as part of a global indeterministic 
dynamics (Ghirardi et al., [1986]; Bell, [1987a]). Even no-collapse theories have to 
claim that the random outcomes are not reducible to hidden variables.6 
 
1.2 Random Behaviour 
 
The most basic model that population genetics provides for calculating the 
distribution of genetic traits in an offspring generation from the distribution of such 
traits in the parent generation is the Hardy-Weinberg Law (Hartl, [2000], p. 26–9).7 
This law idealises many aspects of reproduction; one crucial assumption is that 
mating between members of the parent generation is random. That is, whether mating 
occurs between arbitrarily selected members of the parent population does not depend 
on the presence or absence of the genetic traits in question in those members. Human 
mating, of course, is not random with respect to many genetic traits: the presence of 
particular height or skin colour, for example, does influence whether two human 
individuals will mate. But even in humans mating is random with respect to some 
traits: blood group, for example. In some organisms, for instance some corals and 
fish, spawning is genuinely random: the parent population gathers in one location and 
each individual simply ejects their sperm or eggs into the ocean where they are left to 
collide and fertilise; which two individuals end up mating is a product of the random 
mixing of the ocean currents. The randomness of mating is a pre-requisite for the 
application of the simple dynamics; there is no explicit presence of a random state 
transition, but such behaviour is presupposed in the application of the theory. 
Despite its many idealisations, the Hardy-Weinberg principle is explanatory of 
the dynamics of genetic traits in a population. Complicating the law by making its 
assumptions more realistic only serves to indicate how various unusual features of 
actual population dynamics can be deftly explained as a disturbance of the basic 
underlying dynamics encoded in the law. As we have seen, for some populations, the 
assumptions are not even idealised. Each mating event is random, but nevertheless the 
overall distribution of mating is determined by the statistical features of the 
population as a whole. 
Another nice example of random behaviour occurs in game theory. In many 
games where players have only incomplete information about each other, a 
randomising mixed strategy dominates any pure strategy (Suppes, [1984], pp. 210–2). 
Another application of the concept of randomness is to agents involved in the 
evolution of conventions (Skyrms, [1996], pp. 75–6). For example, in the convention 
of stopping at lights which have two colours but no guidance as to the intended 
meaning of each, or in the reading of certain kinds of external indicators in a game of 
chicken (hawk-dove), the idea is that the players in the game can look to an external 
source, perceived as random, and take that as providing a way of breaking a 
symmetry and escaping a non-optimal mixed equilibrium in favour of what Aumann 
calls a correlated equilibrium. In this case, as in many others, the epistemic aspects of 
randomness are most important for its role in scientific explanations. 
 
1.3 Random Sampling 
 
In many statistical contexts, experimenters have to select a representative sample of a 
population. This is obviously important in cases where the statistical properties of the 
whole population are of most interest . It is also important when constructing other 
experiments, for instance in clinical or agricultural trials, where the patients or fields 
selected should be independent of the treatment given and representative of the 
population from which they came with respect to treatment efficacy. The key 
assumption that classical statistics makes in these cases is that the sample is random 
(Fisher, [1935]).8 The idea here, again, is that we should expect no correlation 
between the properties whose distribution the test is designed to uncover and the 
properties that decide whether or not a particular individual should be tested. 
In Fisher’s famous thought experiment, we suppose a woman claims to be able 
to taste whether milk was added to the empty cup or to the tea. We wish to test her 
discriminatory powers; we present her with eight cups of tea, exactly four of which 
had the milk added first. The outcome of a trial of this experiment is a judgement by 
the woman of which cups of tea had milk. The experimenter must strive to avoid 
correlation between the order in which the cups are presented, and whatever internal 
algorithm the woman uses to decide which cups to classify as milk-first. That is, he 
must randomise the cup order. If her internal algorithm is actually correlated with the 
presence of milk-first, the randomising should only rule out those cases where it is 
not, namely, those cases where she is faking it. 
An important feature of this case is that it is important that the cup selection be 
random to the woman, but not to the experimenters. The experimenters want a certain 
kind of patternlessness in the ordering of the cups, a kind of disorder that is designed 
to disturb accidental correlations (Dembski, [1991]). The experimenters also wish 
themselves to know in what order the cups are coming; the experiment would be 
uninterpretable without such knowledge. Intuitively, this order would not be random 
for the experimenters: they know which cup comes next, and they know the recipe by 
which they computed in which order the cups should come. 
 
1.4 Caprice, Arbitrariness, and Noise 
 
John Earman has argued that classical Newtonian mechanics is indeterministic, on the 
basis of a very special kind of case (Earman, [1986], pp. 33–39). Because Newtonian 
physics imposes no upper bound on the velocity of a point particle, it is nomologically 
possible in Newtonian mechanics to have a particle whose velocity is finite but 
unbounded, which appears at spatial infinity at some time t (this is the temporal 
inverse of an unboundedly accelerating particle that limits to an infinite velocity in a 
finite time). Prior to t that particle had not been present in the universe; hence the 
prior state does not determine the future state, since such a ‘space invader’ particle is 
possible. Of course, such a space invader is completely unexpected—it is plausible, I 
think, to regard such an occurrence as completely and utterly random and arbitrary. 
Randomness in this case does not capture some potentially explanatory aspect of 
some process or phenomenon, but rather serves to mark our recognition of complete 
capriciousness in the event. 
More earthly examples are not hard to find. Shannon noted that when 
modelling signal transmission systems, it is inappropriate to think that the only 
relevant factors are the information transmitted and the encoding of that information 
(Shannon & Weaver, [1949]). There are physical factors that can corrupt the physical 
representation of that data (say, stray interference with an electrical or radio signal). It 
is not appropriate or feasible to explicitly incorporate such disturbances in the model, 
especially since they serve a purely negative role and cannot be controlled for, only 
accommodated. These models therefore include a random noise factor: random 
alterations of the signal with a certain probability distribution. All the models we have 
mentioned include noise as a confounding factor, and it is a very general technique for 
simulating the pattern of disturbances even in deterministic systems with no other 
probabilistic aspect. The randomness of the noise is crucial: if it were not random, it 
could be explicitly addressed and controlled for. As it stands, noise in signalling 
systems is addressed by complex error-checking protocols, which, if they work, rely 
crucially on the random and unsystematic distribution of errors. A further example is 
provided by the concept of random mutation in classical evolutionary theory. It may 
be that, from a biochemical perspective, the alterations in DNA produced by 
imperfect copying are deterministic. Nevertheless, these mutations are random with 
respect to the genes they alter, and hence the differential fitness they convey.9 
 
2 Concepts of Randomness 
 
If we are to understand what randomness is, we must begin with the scientifically 
acceptable uses of the concept. These form a rough picture of the intuitions that 
scientists marshal when describing a phenomenon as random; our task is to 
systematise these intuitions as best we can into a rigorous philosophical analysis of 
this intuitive conception. 
Consider some of the competing demands on an analysis of randomness that 
may be prompted by our examples. 
 
1. Statistical Testing We need a concept of randomness adequate for use in random 
sampling and randomised experiments. In particular, we need to be able to 
produce random sequences on demand, and ascertain whether a given sequence is 
random. 
 
2. Finite Randomness The concept of randomness must apply to the single event, as 
in Earman’s example or a single instance of random mating. It must at least apply 
to finite phenomena. 
 
3. Explanation and Confirmation Attributions of randomness must be able to be 
explanatorily effective, indicating why certain systems exhibit the kinds of 
behaviour they do; to this end, the hypothesis that a system is random must be 
amenable to incremental empirical confirmation or disconfirmation. 
 
4. Determinism The existence of random processes must be compatible with 
determinism; else we cannot explain the use of randomness to describe processes 
in population genetics or chaotic dynamics. 
 
Confronted with this variety of uses of randomness to describe such varied 
phenomena, one may be tempted to despair: ‘Indeed, it seems highly doubtful that 
there is anything like a unique notion of randomness there to be explicated.’ (Howson 
& Urbach, [1993], p. 324). Even if one recognises that these demands are merely 
suggested by the examples and may not survive careful scrutiny, this temptation may 
grow stronger when one considers how previous explications of randomness deal with 
the cases we described above. This we shall now do with the two most prominent past 
attempts to define randomness: the place selection/statistical test conception and the 
complexity conception of randomness. Both do poorly in meeting our criteria; poorly 
enough that if a better account were to be proposed, we should reject them. 
 
2.1 Von Mises/Church/Martin-Löf Randomness 
 
Definition 1 (von Mises-Randomness). An infinite sequence S  of outcomes of types 
  
A1,K,An , is vM-random iff (i) every outcome type Ai  has a well-defined relative 
frequency relf iS  in S ; and (ii) for every infinite subsequence S*  chosen by an 
admissible place selection, the relative frequency of Ai  remains the same as in the 
larger sequence: relfiS  =  relfiS* . 
Immediately, the definition only applies to infinite sequences, and so fails 
condition (2) of finiteness. 
What is an admissible place selection? Von Mises himself says: 
 
[T]he question whether or not a certain member of the original sequence 
belongs to the selected partial sequence should be settled independently of the 
result of the observation, i.e. before anything is known about the result. 
([1957], p. 25). 
 
The intuition is that, if we pick out subsequences independently of the 
contents of the elements we pick (by paying attention only to their indices, for 
example), and each of those has the same limit relative frequencies of outcomes, then 
the sequence is random. If we could pick out a biased subsequence, that would 
indicate that some set of indices had a greater than chance probability of being 
occupied by some particular outcome; the intuition is that such an occurrence would 
not be consistent with randomness. 
Church ([1940]), attempting to make von Mises’ remarks precise, proposed 
that admissible place selections are recursive functions that decide whether an 
element si  is to be included in a subsequence on input of the index number i and the 
initial segment of the sequence up to si!1 . For example, ‘select only the odd numbered 
elements’, and ‘select any element that comes after the subsequence 010’ are both 
admissible place selections. An immediate corollary is that no random sequence can 
be recursively computable: else there would be a recursive function that would choose 
all and only 1s from the initial sequence, namely, the function which generates the 
sequence itself. But if a random sequence cannot be effectively generated, we cannot 
produce random sequences for use in statistical testing. Neither can we effectively 
test, for some given sequence, whether it is random. For such a test would involve 
exhaustively checking all recursive place selections to see whether they produce a 
deviant subsequence, and this is not decidable in any finite time (though for any non-
random sequence, at some finite time the checking machine will halt with a ‘no’ 
answer). If random sequences are neither producible or discernible, they are useless 
for statistical testing purposes, failing the first demand. This point may be made more 
striking by noting that actual statistical testing only ever involves finite sequences; 
and no finite sequence can be vM-random at all. 
Furthermore, it is perfectly possible that some genuinely vM-random infinite 
sequence has an arbitrarily biased initial segment, even to the point where all the 
outcomes of the sequence that actually occur during the life of the universe are 1s. A 
theorem of Ville ([1939]) establishes a stronger result: given any countable set of 
place selections ! i{ } , there is some infinite sequence S  such that the limit frequency 
of 1s in any subsequence of S* = ! j(S)  selected by some place selection is one half, 
despite the fact that for every finite initial segment of the sequence, the frequency of 
1s is greater than or equal to one half (van Lambalgen, [1987], pp. 730–1, 745–8). 
That is, any initial segment of this sequence is not random with respect to the whole 
sequence or any infinite selected subsequence. There seems to be no empirical 
constraint that could lead us to postulate that such a sequence is genuinely vM-
random. Indeed, since any finite sequence is recursively computable, no finite 
segment will ever provide enough evidence to justify claiming that the actual 
sequence of outcomes of which it is a part is random. That our evidence is at best 
finite means that the claim that an actual sequence is vM-random is empirically 
underdetermined, and deserving of a arbitrarily low credence because any finite 
sequence is better explained by some other hypothesis (e.g. that it is produced by 
some pseudo-random function). vM-randomness is a profligate hypothesis that we 
cannot be justified in adopting. Hence it can play no role in explanations of random 
phenomena in finite cases, where more empirically tractable hypotheses will do far 
better. 
One possible exception is in those cases where we have a rigorous 
demonstration that the behaviour in question cannot be generated by a deterministic 
system—in that case, the system may be genuinely vM-random. Even granting the 
existence of such demonstrations, note that in this case we have made essential appeal 
to a fact about the random process that produces the sequence, and we have strictly 
gone beyond the content of the evidence sequence in making that appeal. Here we 
have simply abandoned the quest to explain deterministic randomness. Random 
sequences may well exist for infinite strings of quantum mechanical measurement 
outcomes, but we don’t think that random phenomena are confined to indeterministic 
phenomena alone: vM-randomness fails demand (4). 
Partly in response to these kinds of worries, a final modification of Von 
Mises’ suggestion was made by Martin-Löf ([1966], [1970], [1969]). His idea is that 
biased sequences are possible but unlikely: non-random sequences, including the 
types of sequences considered in Ville’s theorem, form a set of measure zero in the 
set of all infinite binary sequences. Martin-Löf’s idea is that truly random sequences 
satisfy all the probability one properties of a certain canonical kind: recursive 
sequential significance tests—this means (roughly) that a sequence is random with 
respect to some hypothesis Hp  about probability p of some outcome in that sequence 
if it does not provide grounds for rejecting Hp  at arbitrarily small levels of 
significance.10 Van Lambalgen ([1987]) shows that Martin-Löf (ML)-random 
sequences are, with probability 1, vM-random sequences also—almost all strictly 
increasing sets of integers (Wald place selections) select infinite subsequences of a 
random sequence that preserve relative frequencies. 
Finally, as Dembski ([1991]) points out, for the purposes of statistical testing, 
‘Randomness, properly to be randomness, must leave nothing to chance.’ (p. 75) This 
is the idea that in constructing statistical tests and random number generators, the first 
thing to be considered is the kinds of patterns that one wants the random object to 
avoid instantiating. Then one considers the kinds of objects that can be constructed to 
avoid matching these tests. In this case, take the statistical tests you don’t want your 
sequence to fail, and make sure that the sequence is random with respect to these 
patterns. Arbitrary segments of ML-random sequences cannot satisfy this 
requirement, since they must leave up to chance exactly which entities come to 
constitute the random selection. 
 
2.2 KCS-randomness 
 
One aspect of random sequences we have tangentially touched on is that random 
sequences are intuitively complex and disordered. Random mating is disorderly at the 
level of individuals; random rainfall inputs are complex to describe. The other main 
historical candidate for an analysis of randomness, suggested by the work of 
Kolmogorov, Chaitin and Solomonov (KCS), begins with the idea that randomness is 
the (algorithmic) complexity of a sequence.11 
The complexity of a sequence is defined in terms of effective production of 
that sequence. 
 
Definition 2 (Complexity). The complexity KT(S)  of sequence S is the length of the 
shortest programme C of some Turing machine T which produces S as output, when 
given as input the length of S. (KT(S)  is set to ∞ is there does not exist a C that 
produces S). 
 
This definition is machine-dependent; some Turing machines are able to more 
compactly encode some sequences. Kolmogorov showed that there exist universal 
Turing machines U such that for any sequence S, 
 
(1)  !T"cT (KU (S) #KT(S) + cT ),  
 
where the constant cT  doesn’t depend on the length of the sequence, and hence can be 
made arbitrarily small as the length of the sequence increases. Such machines are 
known as asymptotically optimal machines. If we let the complexity of a sequence be 
defined relative to such a machine, we get a relatively machine-independent 
characterisation of complexity.12 The upper bound on complexity of a sequence of 
length l is approximately l—we can always resort to hard-coding the sequence plus an 
instruction to print it. 
 
Definition 3 (KCS-Randomness). A sequence S is KCS-random if its complexity is 
approximately its length: K(S) !   l(S) .13 
 
One natural way to apply this definition to physical processes is to regard the 
sequence to be generated as a string of successive outcomes of some such process. In 
dynamical systems, this would naturally be generated by examining trajectories in the 
system: sequences that list the successive cells (of some partition of the state space) 
that are traversed by a system over time. KCS-randomness is thus primarily a 
property of trajectories. This notion turns out to be able to be connected with a 
number of other mathematical concepts that measure some aspects of randomness in 
the context of dynamical systems.14 
This definition fares markedly better with respect to some of our demands 
than vM-randomness. Firstly, there are finite sequences that are classified as KCS-
random. For each l, there are 2 l  binary sequences of length l. But the non-KCS-
random sequences amongst them are all generated by programmes of less than length 
l ! k , for some k; hence there will be at most 2 l! k  programmes which generate non-
KCS-random sequences. But the fraction 2 l! k / 2l  =  1/2 k ; so the proportion of non-
KCS-random sequences within all sequences of length l (for all l) decreases 
exponentially with the degree of compressibility demanded. Even for very modest 
compression in large sequences (say, k = 20, l = 1000) less than 1 in a million 
sequences will be non-KCS-random. It should, I think, trouble us that, by the same 
reasoning, longer sequences are more KCS-random. This means that single element 
sequences are not KCS-random, and so the single events they represent are not KCS-
random either.15 
It should also disturb us that biased sequences are less KCS-random than 
unbiased sequences (Earman, [1986], pp. 143–5). A sequence of tosses of a biased 
coin (e.g. Pr(H) > 0.5 ) can be expected to have more frequent runs of consecutive 1s 
than an unbiased sequence; the biased sequence will be more compressible. A single 1 
interrupting a long sequence of 0s is even less KCS-random. But in each of these 
cases, intuitively, the distribution of 1s in the sequence can be as random as desired, 
to the point of satisfying all the statistical significance tests for their probability value. 
This is important because stochastic processes occur with arbitrary underlying 
probability distributions, and randomness needs to apply to all of them: intuitively, 
random mating would not be less random were the distribution over genotypes non-
uniform. 
 
What about statistical testing? Here, again, there are no effective computational tests 
for KCS-randomness, nor any way of effectively producing a KCS-random 
sequence.16 This prevents KCS-random sequences being effectively useful in random 
sampling and randomisation. Furthermore, the lack of an effective test renders the 
hypothesis of KCS-randomness of some sequence relatively immune to confirmation 
or disconfirmation. 
One suggestion is that perhaps we were mistaken in thinking that KCS 
complexity is an analysis of randomness; perhaps, as Earman ([1986]) suggests, it 
actually is an analysis of disorder in a sequence, irrespective of the provenance of that 
sequence. Be that as it may, the problems above seem to disqualify KCS-randomness 
from being a good analysis of randomness. (Though random phenomena typically 
exhibit disorderly behaviour, and this may explain how these concepts became linked, 
this connection is neither necessary or sufficient.) 
 
3 Randomness is Unpredictability: Preliminaries 
 
Perhaps the foregoing survey of mathematical concepts of randomness has convinced 
you that no rigorously clarified concept can meet every demand on the concept of 
randomness that our scientific intuitions place on it. Adopting a best candidate theory 
of content (Lewis, [1984]), one may be drawn to the conclusion that no concept 
perfectly fills the role delineated by our four demands, and one may then settles on 
(for example) KCS-randomness as the best partial filler of the randomness role. 
Of course this conclusion only follows if there is no better filler of the role. I 
think there is. My hypothesis is that scientific randomness is best analysed as a certain 
kind of unpredictability. I think this proposal can satisfy each of the demands that 
emerge from our quick survey of scientific applications of randomness. Before I can 
state my analysis in full, some preliminaries need to be addressed. 
 
3.1 Process and Product Randomness 
 
The mathematical  accounts of randomness we addressed do not, on the surface, make 
any claims about scientific randomness. Rather, these accounts invite us to infer, from 
the randomness of some sequence, that the process underlying that sequence was 
random (or that an event produced by that process and part of that sequence was 
random). Our demands were all constraints on random processes, requiring that they 
might be used to randomise experiments, to account for random behaviour, and that 
they might underlie stochastic processes and be compatible with determinism. Our 
true concern, therefore, is with process randomness, not product randomness 
(Earman, [1986], pp. 137–8). Our survey showed that the inference from product to 
process randomness failed: the class of processes that possess vM-random or KCS-
random outcome sequences fails to satisfy the intuitive constraints on the class of 
random processes.17 
Typically, appeals are made at this point to theorems which show that ‘almost 
all’ random processes produce random outcome sequences, and vice versa (Frigg, 
[2004], p. 431). These appeals are beside the point. Firstly, the theorems depend on 
quite specific mathematical details of the models of the systems in question, and these 
details do not generalise to all the circumstances in which randomness is found, 
giving such theorems very limited applicability. Secondly, even where these theorems 
can be established, there remains a logical gap between process randomness and 
product randomness, some random processes exhibit highly ordered outcomes. Such a 
possibility surely contradicts any claim that product randomness and process 
randomness are ‘extensionally equivalent’ (Frigg, [2004], p. 431). 
What is true is that product randomness is a defeasible incentive to inquire 
into the physical basis of the outcome sequence, and it provides at least a prima facie 
reason to think that a process is random. Indeed, this presumptive inference may 
explain much of the intuitive pull exercised by the von Mises and KCS accounts of 
randomness. For, insofar as these accounts do capture typical features of the outputs 
of random processes, they can appear to give an analysis of randomness. But this 
presumptive inference can be defeated; and even the evidential status of random 
products is less important than it seems—on my account, far less stringent tests than 
von Mises or KCS can be applied that genuinely do pick out the random processes. 
 
3.2 Randomness is Indeterminism? 
 
The comparative neglect of the concept of randomness by philosophers is in large part 
due, I think, to the pervasive belief in the pernicious hypothesis that a physical 
process is random just when that process is indeterministic. Hellman, while 
concurring with our conclusion that no mathematical definition of random sequence 
can adequately capture physical randomness, claims that ‘physical randomness’ is 
‘roughly interchangeable with “indeterministic”’ (Hellman, [1978], p. 83). 
Indeterminism here means that the complete and correct scientific theory of 
the process is indeterministic. A scientific theory we take to be a class of models (van 
Fraassen, [1989], ch. 9). An individual model will be a particular history of the states 
that a system traverses (a specification of the properties and changes in properties of 
the physical system over time): call such a history a trajectory of the system. The 
class of all possible trajectories is the scientific theory. Two types of constraints 
govern the trajectories: the dynamical laws (like Newton’s laws of motion) and the 
boundary conditions (like the Hamiltonian of a classical system restricts a given 
history to a certain allowable energy surface) govern which states can be accessed 
from which other states, while the laws of coexistence and boundary conditions 
determine which properties can be combined to form an allowable state (for instance, 
the idea gas law PV = nRT   constrains which combinations of pressure and volume 
can coexist in a state). This model of a scientific theory is supposed to be very 
general: the states can be those of the phase space of classical statistical mechanics, or 
the states of soil moisture, or of a particular genetic distribution in a population, while 
the dynamics can include any mappings between states.18 
 
Definition 4 (Earman-Montague Determinism). A scientific theory is deterministic 
iff any two trajectories in models of that system which overlap at one point overlap at 
every point. A theory is indeterministic iff it is not deterministic; equivalently, if two 
systems can be in the same state at one time and evolve into distinct states. A system 
is (in)deterministic iff the theory which completely and correctly describes it is 
(in)deterministic. (Earman, [1986]; Montague, [1974]) 
 
Is it plausible that the catalogue of random phenomena we began with can be 
simply unified by the assumption that randomness is indeterminism? It seems not. 
Many of the phenomena we enumerated do not seem to depend for their randomness 
on the fact that the world in which they are instantiated is one where quantum 
indeterminism is the correct theory of the microphysical realm. One can certainly 
imagine that Newton was right. In Newtonian possible worlds, the kinds of random 
phenomena that chaotic dynamics gives rise to are perfectly physically possible; so 
too with random mating, which depends on a high-level probabilistic hypothesis 
about the structure of mating interactions, not low-level indeterminism.19 Our 
definition of indeterminism made no mention of the concept of probability; an 
adequate understanding of randomness, on the other hand, must show how 
randomness and probability are related—hence indeterminism cannot be randomness. 
Moreover, we must at least allow for the possibility that quantum mechanics will turn 
out to be deterministic, as on the Bohm theory (Bell, [1987b]). Finally, it seems 
wrong to say that coin tossing is indeterministic, or that creatures engage in 
indeterministic mating: it would turn out to be something of a philosophical 
embarrassment if the only analysis our profession could provide made these claims 
correct. 
One response of behalf of the pernicious hypothesis is that, while classical 
physics is deterministic, it is nevertheless, on occasion, a useful idealisation to pretend 
that a given process is indeterministic, and hence random.20 I think that this response 
confuses the content of concepts deployed within a theory, like the concept of 
randomness, with the external factors that contribute to the adoption of a theory, such 
as that theory being adequate for the task at hand, and therefore being a useful 
idealisation. Classical statistical mechanics does not say that it is a useful idealisation 
that gas motion is random; the theory is an idealisation that says gas motion is 
random, simpliciter. Here, I attempt to give a characterisation of randomness that is 
uniform across all theories, regardless of whether those theories are deployed as 
idealisations or as perfectly accurate descriptions. 
We must also be careful to explain why the hypothesis that randomness is 
indeterminism seems plausible to the extent that it does. I think that the historical 
connection of determinism with prediction in the Laplacean vision can explain the 
intuitive pull of the idea that randomness is objective indeterminism. I believe that a 
historical mistake still governs our thinking in this area, for when increasing 
conceptual sophistication enabled us to tease apart the concepts of determinism and 
predictability, randomness remained connected to determinism, rather than with its 
rightful partner, predictability. It is to the concept of predictability that we now turn. 
 
4 Predictability 
 
Laplace’s vision is that determinism is idealised predictability: 
 
 
[A]n intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is 
animated  and the respective situation of all the [things which] compose it—an 
intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis—it would 
embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies in the 
universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and 
the future, as well as the past, would be present to its eyes. ([1951], p. 4) 
 
 
Definition 5 (Laplacean Determinism). A system is Laplacean deterministic iff it 
would be possible for an epistemic agent who knew precisely the instantaneous state 
and could analyse the dynamics of that system to predict with certainty the entire 
precise trajectory of the system. 
 
A Laplacean deterministic system is where the epistemic features of some 
ideal agent cohere perfectly with the ontological features of that world. Given that 
there are worlds where prediction and determinism mesh in this way, it is easy to 
think that prediction and determinism are closely related concepts.21 
There are two main ways to make the features of this idealised epistemic agent 
more realistic that would undermine this close connection. The first way is to try and 
make the epistemic capacities of the agent to ascertain the instantaneous state more 
realistic. The second way is to make the computational and analytic capacities of the 
agent more realistic. Weakening the epistemic abilities of the ideal agent allows us to 
clearly see the separation of predictability and determinism.22 
 
4.1 Epistemic Constraints on Prediction 
 
The first kind of constraint to note concerns our ability to precisely ascertain the 
instantaneous state of a system. At best, we can establish that the system was in a 
relatively small region of the state space, over a relatively short interval of time. 
There are several reasons for this. Most importantly, we humans are limited in 
our epistemic capabilities. Our measurement apparatus is not capable of arbitrary 
discrimination between different states, and is typically only able to distinguish 
properties that correspond to quite coarse partitions of the state space. In the case of 
classical statistical mechanics of an ideal gas in a box, the standard partition of the 
state space is into regions that are macroscopically distinguishable by means of 
standard mechanical and thermodynamic properties: pressure, temperature, volume. 
We are simply not capable of distinguishing states that can differ by arbitrarily little: 
one slight shift of position in one particle in a mole of gas. In such cases, with even 
one macrostate compatible with more than one indistinguishable microstate, 
predictability for us and determinism do not match; our epistemic situation is 
typically worse than this.23 
There is an ‘in principle’ restriction too. Measurement involves interactions: a 
system must be disturbed, ever so slightly, in order for it to affect the system that is 
our measurement device. We are forced to meddle and manipulate the natural world 
in ways that render uncertain the precise state of the system. This has two 
consequences. Firstly, measurement alters the state of the system, meaning we are 
never able to know the precise pre-measurement state (Bishop, [2003], §5). This is 
even more pressing if we consider the limitations that quantum mechanics places on 
simultaneous measurement of complementary quantities. Secondly, measurement 
introduces errors into the specification of the state. Repetition does only so much to 
counter these errors; physical magnitudes are always accompanied by their 
experimental margin of error. 
It would be a grave error to think that the in principle limitations are the more 
significant restrictions on predictions. On the contrary: prediction is an activity that 
arose primarily in the context of agency, where having reasonable expectations about 
the future is essential for rational action. Creatures who were not goal directed would 
have no use for predictions. As such, an adequate account of predictability must make 
reference to the actual abilities of the epistemic agents who are deploying the theories 
to make predictions. An account of prediction which neglected these pragmatic 
constraints would thereby leave out why the concept of prediction is important or 
interesting at all (Schurz, [1995], §6). 
A nice example of the consequences of imprecise specification of initial 
conditions is furnished by the phenomenon from chaotic dynamics known as sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions, or ‘error inflation’ (Smith, [1998], pp. 15, 167–8). 
Consider some small bundle of initial states S, and some state s0 !S . Then, for some 
systems, 
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That is, for some bundle of state space points that are within some arbitrary distance 
in the state space, there are at least two states whose subsequent trajectories diverge 
by at least after some time t. In fact, for typically chaotic systems, all neighbouring 
trajectories within the bundle of states diverge exponentially fast. Predictability fails; 
knowledge of initial macrostates, no matter how fine grained, can always leave us in a 
position where the trajectories traversing the microstates that compose that initial 
macrostate each end up in a completely different macrostate, giving us no decisive 
prediction. 
How well can we accommodate this behaviour? It turns out then that 
predictability in such cases is exponentially expensive in initial data; to predict even 
one more stage in the time evolution of the system demands an exponential increase 
in the accuracy of the initial state specification. Given limits on the accuracy of such a 
specification, our ability to predict will run out in a very short time for lots of systems 
of very moderate complexity of description, even if we have the computational 
abilities. However (and this will be important in the sequel) we can predict global 
statistical behaviour of a bundle of trajectories. This is typically because our theory 
yields probabilities of state transitions from one macrostate into another.24 This 
combination of global structure and local instability is an important conceptual 
ingredient in randomness (Smith, [1998], ch. 4). Bishop ([2003]) makes the plausible 
claim that any error in initial measurement will eventually yield errors in prediction, 
but exponential error inflation is a particularly spectacular example. 
 
4.2 Computational Constraints on Prediction 
 
There may also be constraints imposed by our inability to track the evolution of a 
system along its trajectory. Humphreys’ ([1978]) purported counterexamples to the 
thesis that randomness is indeterminism relied on the following possibility: that the 
total history of a system may supervene on a single state, hence the system is 
deterministic, while no computable sequence of states is isomorphic to that history. 
Given the very plausible hypothesis that human predictors have at best the 
computation capacities of Turing machines, this means that some state evolutions are 
not computable by predictors like us. This is especially pronounced when the 
dynamical equations governing of the system are not integrable and do not admit of a 
closed-form solution (Stone, [1989]). Predictions of future states when the dynamics 
are based on open-form solutions are subject to ever-increasing complexity as the 
time scale of the prediction increases. 
There is a sense in which all deterministic systems are computable: each 
system does effectively produce its own output sequence. If we are able (per 
impossibile) to arbitrarily control the initial conditions, then we could use the system 
itself as an ‘analogue computer’ that would simulate its own future behaviour. This, it 
seems to me, would be prediction by cheating. What we demand of a prediction is the 
making of some reasonable, theoretically-informed judgement about the unknown 
behaviour of a system—not remembering how it behaved in the past. (Similarly, 
predicting by consulting a reliable oracle is not genuine prediction either.) I propose 
that, for our purposes, we set prediction by cheating aside as irrelevant. 
An important issue for computation of predictions is the internal discrete 
representation of continuous physical magnitudes; this significant problem is 
completely bypassed by analogue computation (Earman, [1986], ch. VI). This 
approach also neglects more mundane restrictions on computations: our finite 
lifespan, resources, memory and patience! 
 
4.3 Pragmatic Constraints on Prediction 
 
There are also constraints placed on prediction by the structure of the theory yielding 
the predictions. Consider thermodynamics. This theory gives perfectly adequate 
dynamical constraints on macroscopic state conditions. But it does not suffice to 
predict a state that specifies the precise momentum and position of each particle; 
those details are ‘invisible’ to the thermodynamic state. Some features of the state are 
thus unpredictable because they are not fixed by the theory’s description of the state. 
This is only of importance because, on occasion, this is a desirable feature of 
theory construction. A theory of population genetics might simply plug in the proviso 
that mating happens unpredictably, where this is to be taken as saying that, for the 
purposes of the explanatory and predictive tasks at hand, it can be effectively treated 
as such. It is more perspicuous not to attempt to explain this higher-order stochastic 
phenomenon in terms of lower level theories. This is part of a general point about the 
explanatory significance of higher-level theories, but it has particular force for 
unpredictability. Some theories don’t repay the effort required to make predictions 
using them, even if those theories could, in principle, predict with certainty. Other 
theories are more simple and effective because various deterministic phenomena are 
treated as absolutely unpredictable. A random aspect of the process is perhaps to be 
seen as a qualitative factor in explanation of some quite different phenomenon; or as 
an ancillary feature not of central importance to the theory; or it might simply be 
proposed as a central irreducible explanatory hypothesis, whose legitimacy derives 
from the fruitfulness of assuming it. Given that explanation and prediction are tasks 
performed by agents with certain cognitive and practical goals in hand (van Fraassen, 
[1980]), the utility of some particular theory for such tasks will be a matter of 
pragmatic qualities of the theory. 
 
4.4 Prediction Defined 
 
Given these various constraints, I will now give a general characterisation of the 
predictability of a process. 
 
Definition 6 (Prediction). A prediction function !P ,T (M ,  t)  takes as input the current 
state M of a system described by a theory T as discerned by a predictor P, and an 
elapsed time parameter, and yields a temporally-indexed probability distribution 
Prt over the space of possible states of the system. A prediction is a specific use of 
some prediction function by some predictor on some initial state and elapsed time, 
who then adopts Prt  as their posterior credence function (conditional on the evidence 
and the theory). (If the elapsed time is negative, the use is a retrodiction.) 
 
Let us unpack this a little. Consider a particular system that has been 
ascertained to be in some state M at some time. The states are supposed to be 
distinguished by the epistemic capacities of the predictors, so that in classical 
mechanics, for example, the states in question will be macrostates, individuated by 
differences in observable parameters such as temperature or pressure. A prediction is 
an attempt to establish what the probability is that the system will be in some other 
state after some time t has elapsed.25 The way such a question is answered, on my 
view, is by deploying a function of a kind whose most general form is a prediction 
function. The agent P who wishes to make the prediction has some epistemic and 
computational capabilities; these delimit the fine-grainedness of the partition of which 
M is a member, and the class of possible functions. The theory T gives the basic 
ingredients for the prediction function, establishing the physical relations between 
states of the theory accepted by the agent. These are contextual features that are fixed 
by the surroundings in which the prediction is made: the epistemic and computational 
limitations of the predictor and the theory being utilised are presuppositions of the 
making of a prediction (Stalnaker, [1984]). These contextual features fix a set of 
prediction functions that are available to potential predictors in that context. The 
actual prediction, however, is the updating of credences by the predictor who 
conditions on observed evidence and accepted theory, which jointly dictate the 
prediction functions that are available to the predictor. 
The notion of an available prediction function may need some explanation. 
Clearly, the agent who updates by simply picking some future event and giving it 
credence 1 is updating his beliefs in future outcomes in a way that meets the 
definition of a prediction function. Nevertheless, this prediction function is (most 
likely) inconsistent with the theory the agent takes to most accurately describe the 
situation he is concerned to predict, unless that agent adopts a very idiosyncratic 
theory. As such, it is accepted theory and current evidence which are to be taken as 
basic; these fix some prediction functions as reasonable for the agents who believe 
those theories and have observed that evidence, and it is those reasonable prediction 
functions that are available to the agent in the sense I have discussed here. 
Availability must be a normative notion; it cannot be, for example, that a prediction 
function is available if an agent could update their credences in accordance with its 
dictates; it must also be reasonable for the agent to update in that way, given their 
other beliefs.26 
Graham Priest suggested to me that the set of prediction functions be all 
recursive functions on the initial data, just so as to make the set of available 
predictions the same for all agents. But I don’t think we need react quite so 
drastically, especially since to assume the availability of these functions is simply to 
reject some of the plausible computational limitations on human predictions. 
This conception of prediction has its roots in consideration of classical 
statistical mechanics, but the use of thermodynamic macrostates as a paradigm for the 
input state M may skew the analysis with respect to other theories.27 The input state M 
must include all the information we currently possess concerning the system whose 
behaviour is to be predicted. This might include the past history of the system, for 
example when we use trends in the stockmarket as input to our predictive economic 
models. It must also include some aspects of the microstate of the system, as in 
quantum mechanics, where the uniform initial distribution over phase space in 
classical statistical mechanics is unavailable, so all probabilities of macroscopic 
outcomes are state dependent. Sometimes we must also include relevant knowledge or 
assumptions about other potentially interacting systems. This holds not only in cases 
where we assume that a system is for all practical purposes closed or isolated, but also 
in special relativity, where we can only predict future events if we impose boundary 
conditions on regions spacelike separated from us (and hence outside our epistemic 
access), for example that those regions are more or less like our past light cone. So the 
input state must be broader than just the current observations of the system, and it 
must include all the ingredients necessary, whatever those might be, to fix on a 
posterior probability function. 
The relation of the dynamical equations of the theory to the available 
prediction functions is an important issue. The aim of a predictive theory is to yield 
useful predictions by means of a modified dynamics that is not too false to the 
underlying dynamics. For some theories, the precise states will be ascertainable and 
the dynamical equations solvable; the prediction functions in this case will just be the 
dynamical equations used in the theory, and the probability distribution over final 
states will be concentrated on a point in the deterministic case, or given by the basic 
probabilistic rule in the indeterministic case (say, Born’s rule in elementary quantum 
theory). Other cases are more complicated. In classical statistical mechanics, we have 
to consider how the entire family of trajectories that intersect M (i.e. overlap the 
microstates s that constitute M) behave under the dynamical laws, and whether 
tractable functions that approximate this behaviour can be found. For instance, the 
very simple prediction function for ergodic statistical mechanical systems is that the 
probability of finding a system in some state M after sufficient time has elapsed is the 
proportion of the phase space that M occupies. This requires a great many 
assumptions and simplifications, ergodicity prominent among them, and each theory 
will have different requirements. The general constraints seem to be those laid down 
in the preceding subsections, but no more detailed universal recipe for producing 
prediction functions can be given. In any case, the particular form of prediction 
functions is a matter for physical theory; the logical properties of such a function are 
those I have specified above. 
Of course, whether any function that meets these formal requirements is a 
useful or good prediction function is another matter. A given prediction function can 
yield a distribution that gives probability one to the whole state space, but no 
information about probabilities over any more fine grained partition. Such a function, 
while perfectly accurate, is pragmatically useless and should be excluded by 
contextual factors. In particular, I presume that the predictor wishes to have the most 
precise partition of states that is compatible with accurate prediction. But the tradeoff 
between accuracy and fine-grainedness will depend on the situation in hand. 
The ultimate goal, of course, is that the probability distribution given by the 
prediction function will serve as normative for the credences of the agents making the 
prediction (van Fraassen, [1989], p. 198). The probabilities are matched with the 
credence by means of a probability coordination rule, of which the Principal Principle 
is the best known example (Lewis, [1980]). This is essential in explaining how 
predictions give rise to action, and is one important reason why the outcomes of a 
prediction must be probabilistic. Another is that we can easily convert a probability 
distribution over states into an expectation value for the random variable that 
represents the unknown state of the system. Prediction can then be described as 
yielding expectation values for some system given an estimation of the current values 
that characterise the system, which enables a large body of statistical methodology to 
come to bear on the use and role of predictions.28 
 
5 Unpredictability 
 
With a characterisation of predictability in hand, we are in a position to characterise 
some of the ways that predictability can fail. Importantly, since we have separated 
predictability from determinism, it turns out that being indeterministic is one way, but 
not the only way, in which a phenomenon can fail to be predictable. 
 
Definition 7 (Unpredictability). An event E (at some temporal distance t) is 
unpredictable for a predictor P iff P’s posterior credence in E after conditioning on 
current evidence and the best prediction function available to P is not 1—that is, if the 
prediction function yields a posterior probability distribution that doesn’t assign 
probability 1 to E.29 
 
There is some worry that this definition is too inclusive—after all, there are 
many future events that are intuitively predictable and yet we are not certain that they 
will occur. This worry can be assuaged by attending to the following two 
considerations. Firstly, this definition captures the idea that an event is not perfectly 
predictable. If the available well-confirmed prediction function allows us to 
considerably raise our posterior credence in the event, we might well be willing to 
credit it with significant predictive powers, even though it does not convey certainty 
on the event. This only indicates that between perfect predictability, and the kind of 
unpredictability we shall call randomness (below, §6), there are greater or lesser 
degrees of unpredictability. Often, in everyday circumstances, we are willing to 
collapse some of these finer distinctions: we are willing, for example, to make little 
distinction between certainty and very high non-unity credences. (This is at least 
partially because the structure of rational preference tends to obscure these slight 
differences which make no practical difference to the courses of action we adopt to 
achieve our preferred outcomes.) It is therefore readily understood that common use 
of the concept of unpredictability should diverge from the letter, but I suggest not the 
spirit, of the definition given above. Secondly, we must recognise that when we are 
prepared to use a theory to predict some event, and yet reserve our assent from full 
certainty in the predictions made, what we express by that is some degree of 
uncertainty regarding the theory. Our belief in and acceptance of theories is a 
complicated business, and we frequently make use of and accept theories that we do 
not believe to be true. Some of what I have to say here about pragmatic factors 
involved in prediction reflects the complexities of this matter. But regardless of our 
final opinion on acceptance and use of theories, it remains true that our conditional 
credences concerning events, conditional on the truth of those theories, capture the 
important credential states as far as predictability is concerned. So, many events are 
predictable according to the definition above, because conditional credence in the 
events is 1, conditional on the simple theories we use to predict them. But we 
nevertheless refrain from full certainty because we are not certain of the simple 
theory. The point is that prediction as I’ve defined it concerns what our credences 
would be if we discharged the condition on those credences, by coming to believe the 
theory with certainty; and this obviously simplifies the actual nature of our epistemic 
relationship with the theories we accept. 
An illustration of the definition in action is afforded by the case of 
indeterminism, the strongest form of unpredictability. If the correct theory of some 
system is indeterministic, then we can imagine an epistemic agent of perfect 
computational and discriminatory abilities, for whom the contextually salient partition 
on state space individuates single states, and who believes the correct theory. An 
event is unpredictable for such an agent just in case knowledge of the present state 
does not concentrate posterior credence only upon states containing the event. If the 
theory is genuinely indeterministic there exist lawful future evolutions of the system 
from the current state to each of incompatible future states S and S*. If there is any 
event true in S but not in S*, that event will be unpredictable. Indeed, if an 
indeterministic theory countenances any events that are not instantiated everywhere in 
the state space, then those events will be unpredictable. 
It is important to note that predictability, while relative to a predictor, is a 
theoretical property of an event. It is the available prediction functions for some given 
theory that determine the predictions that can be made from the perspective of that 
theory. It is the epistemic and computational features of predictors that fix the 
appropriate theories for them to accept—namely, predictors accept theories which 
partition the state space at the right level of resolution to fit their epistemic capacities, 
and provide prediction functions which are well-matched to their computational 
abilities. In other words, the level of resolution and the allowed computational 
expenditure are parameters of predictability, and there will be different characteristic 
or typical parameters for creatures of different kinds, in different epistemic 
communities. This situation provides another perspective on the continued appeal of 
the thesis that randomness is indeterminism. Theories which describe unpredictable 
phenomena, on this account, treat those phenomena as indeterministic. The way that 
the theory represents some situation s is the same as the theory represents some 
distinct situation s* , but the way the theory represents the future evolutions of those 
states st  and st*  are distinct, so that within the theory we have duplicate situations 
evolving to distinct situations. 
It is easy to see how the features that separate prediction from determinism 
also lead to failures of predictability. The limited capacities of epistemic agents to 
detect differences between fundamental detailed states, and hence their limitation to 
relatively coarse-grained partitions over the state space, lead to the possibility of 
diverging trajectories from a single observed coarse state even in deterministic 
systems. Then there will exist events that do not get probability one and are hence 
unpredictable. Note that one and the same type of event can be predicted at one 
temporal distance, and unpredictable at another, if the diverging trajectories require 
some extended interval of time to diverge from each other. 
If the agent does not possess the computational capacities to utilise the most 
accurate prediction functions, they may be forced to rely on simplified or approximate 
methods. If these techniques do lead to predictions of particular events with certainty, 
then either (contra the assumption) the prediction function is not a simplification or 
approximation at all, or the predictions will be incorrect, and the prediction functions 
should be rejected. To avoid rejecting prediction functions that make incorrect but 
close predictions, those functions should be made compatible with the observed 
outcomes by explicitly considering the margins of error on the approximate 
predictions. Then the outputs of such functions can include the actual outcome, as 
well as various small deviations from actuality—they avoid conclusive falsification 
by predicting approximately which state will result. If such approximate predictions 
can include at least a pair of mutually exclusive events, then we have unpredictability 
with respect to those events. 
Finally, if the agent accepts a theory for pragmatic reasons, then that may 
induce a certain kind of failure of predictability, because the agent has restricted the 
range of available prediction functions to those that are provided by the theory subject 
to the agent’s epistemic and computational limitations. An agent who uses 
thermodynamics as his predictive theory in a world where classical statistical 
mechanics is the correct story of the microphysics thereby limits her ability to predict 
outcomes with perfect accuracy (since there are thermodynamically indistinguishable 
states that can evolve into thermodynamically distinguishable outcomes, if those 
initial states are statistical-mechanically distinguishable). Theories also make certain 
partitions of the real state space salient to predictors (the so-called level of description 
that the theory operates at), and this can lead to failures of predictability in much the 
same way as epistemic restrictions can (even though the agents might have other, 
pragmatic, reasons for adopting those partitions as salient—for instance, the 
explanatory value of robust macroscopic accounts). 
 
6 Randomness is Unpredictability 
 
We are now in a position to discuss my proposed analysis. The views suggested by 
Suppes and Kyburg in the epigraphs to this paper provide some support for this 
proposal—philosophical intuition obviously acknowledges some epistemic 
constraints on legitimate judgements of randomness. I think that these epistemic 
features, derived from pragmatic and objective constraints on human knowledge, 
exhaust the concept of randomness. 
As I discussed earlier, some events which satisfy my definition of 
unpredictability are only mildly unpredictable. For instance, if the events are 
distinguished in a fine-grained way, and the prediction concentrates the posterior 
probability over only two of those events, then we may have a very precise and 
accurate prediction, even if not perfect. These failures of prediction do not, 
intuitively, produce randomness. So what kind of unpredictability do I think 
randomness is? 
The following definition captures my proposal: randomness is maximal 
unpredictability. 
 
Definition 8 (Randomness). An event E is random for a predictor P using theory T 
iff E is maximally unpredictable. An event E is maximally unpredictable for P and T 
iff the posterior probability of E, yielded by the prediction functions that T makes 
available, conditional on current evidence, is equal to the prior probability of E. This 
also means that P’s posterior credence in E, conditional on theory and current 
evidence (the current state of the system), must be equal to P’s prior credence in E 
conditional only on theory. 
 
We may call a process random, by extension, if each of the outcomes of the 
process are random. So rainfall inputs constitute a random process because the timing 
and magnitude of each rainfall event is random.30 That is, since the outcomes of a 
process 
  
E1,K,  En{ }  partition the event space, the posterior probability distribution 
(conditional on theory and evidence) is identical to the prior probability distribution.31 
This definition and its extension immediately yields another, very 
illuminating, way to characterise randomness: a random event is probabilistically 
independent of the current and past states of the system, given the probabilities 
supported by the theory (when those current and past states are in line with the coarse-
graining of the event space appropriate for the epistemic and pragmatic features of the 
predictor). The characteristic random events, on this construal, are the successive 
tosses of a coin: independent trials, identically distributed because the theory which 
governs each trial is the same, and the current state is irrelevant to the next or 
subsequent trials—a so-called Bernoulli process. But the idea of randomness as 
probabilistic independence is of far wider application than just to these types of cases, 
since any useful prediction method aims to uncover a significant correlation between 
future outcomes and present evidence, which would give probabilistic dependence 
between outcomes and input states. This connection between unpredictability and 
probabilistic independence is in large part what allows our analysis to give a 
satisfactory account of the statistical properties of random phenomena. I regard it as a 
significant argument in favour of my account that it can explain this close connection. 
However, there are a number of processes for which a strict probabilistic 
independence assumption fails. For example, though over long time scales the 
weather is quite unpredictable, from day to day the weather is more stable: a fine day 
is more likely to be followed by another fine day. Weather is not best modelled by a 
Bernoulli process, but rather by a Markov process, that is, one where the probability 
of an outcome on a trial is explicitly dependent on the current state. Indeed, probably 
most natural processes are not composed of a sequence of independent events. 
Independence of events in a system is likely only to show itself over timescales where 
sensitive dependence on initial conditions and simplified dynamics have time to 
compound errors to the point where nothing whatsoever can be reliably inferred from 
the present case to some quite distant future event.32 The use of ‘random’ to describe 
those processes which may display some short term predictability is quite in order, 
once we recognise the further contextual parameter of the temporal distance between 
input state and event (or random variable) to be predicted, and that for quite 
reasonable timescales these processes can become unpredictable. (This also helps us 
decide not to classify as random those processes which are unpredictable in the limit 
as t grows arbitrarily, but which are remarkably regular and predictable at the 
timescales of human experimenters.) That the commonsense notion of randomness 
includes such partially unpredictable processes is a prima facie reason to take 
unpredictability, not independence, to be the fundamental notion—though nothing 
should obscure the fact that probabilistic independence is the most significant aspect 
of unpredictability for our purposes.33 
It is a central presupposition of my view that we can make robust statistical 
predictions concerning any process, random or not.34 One of the hallmarks of random 
processes is that these are the best reliable predictions we can make, since the 
expectations of the variables whose values describe the characteristics of the event are 
well defined even while the details of the particular outcomes are obscure prior to 
their occurrence. This is crucial for the many scientific applications of randomness: 
random selections are unpredictable with respect to the exact composition of a sample 
(the event), but the overall distribution of properties over the individuals in that 
sample is supposed to be representative of the frequencies in the population as a 
whole. In random mating, the details of each mating pair are not predictable, but the 
overall rates of mating between parents of like genotype is governed by the frequency 
of that genotype in the population.35 
I wish to emphasise again the role of theories. An event is random, just if it is 
unpredictable, that is, if the best theoretical representation of that event relative to a 
given predictor leaves the probability of that event unchanged when conditioned on 
the current state and the laws of the theory. We should give a naturalised account of 
the best theory relative to a predictor: that theory should be the one that maximises fit 
between the epistemic and computational capacities of the predictors and the demands 
on those capacities made by the theory, where those capacities are perfectly objective 
features of the predictors. An event is random, then, just in case these objective 
features of the agents in question render that event unpredictable.36 This means, 
therefore, that while ascriptions of randomness are sensitive to the requirements of the 
agents who are using the concept and making the ascriptions, they are nevertheless 
objectively determined, by the theories it is (objectively) appropriate for those agents 
to utilise. Randomness is thus an extrinsic property of events, dependent on properties 
of agents and the theories they use. This observation will become important below 
(§6.3), when discussing whether randomness as I have defined it is subjective. 
 
6.1 Clarification of the Definition of Randomness 
 
The definition of randomness might be further clarified by close examination of a 
particularly nice example that Tim Williamson proposed to me. Williamson’s 
example was as follows: let us suppose that I regularly play chess against an opponent 
who is far superior to me. Not only does he beat me consistently; he beats me without 
my being aware at the time of his strategy and without my being able to anticipate any 
but the most obvious of his moves. I cannot predict what his moves will be. Prima 
facie, it may appear that my proposal is committed to classifying his moves as 
random; if true, that would pose a serious problem for the view. 
Thankfully, there exist at least three lines of response to this example, each of 
which illuminates the thesis that randomness is unpredictability. Firstly, note that 
unpredictability is theory relative. It is not only the statistical aspects (i.e. actual 
frequencies of outcomes) of a phenomenon which dictate how it will be represented 
by theory; if I am convinced that my opponent is an agent who reasons and plans, no 
theory I will accept will have the consequence that his chess-playing behaviour is 
entirely random. Indeed, we will never regard these apparently probabilistic outcomes 
as indicative of genuine probabilistic independence (since genuine probabilities have 
a modal aspect not exhausted by the actual statistics). What we have in this case is not 
sufficient for randomness because we will never accept that the goal-directed 
activities of a rational agent are genuinely unpredictable, nor are those behaviours 
really probabilistically independent of preceding states: I certainly regard my 
opponent as being in a position to predict his own behaviour, and to predict it on the 
basis of the current state of play. Of course, in this situation, the theories which are 
directly available to me are not sufficient to enable me to predict that behaviour. 
This leads to consideration of a second point. It is essential to note that 
judgements of predictability will typically be made by an epistemic or scientific 
community, and not a particular individual. It is communities which accept scientific 
theories, and the capabilities and expertise of each member of the community 
contributes to its predictive powers. This is because the set of available prediction 
functions in a given theory does not reflect merely personal idiosyncrasies in 
understanding the theory, but instead reflects the intersubjective consensus on the 
capabilities of that theory. Since the relevant bearer of a predictive ability is an 
epistemic community, a phenomenon is judged random with respect to a community 
of predictors, not an individual. My chess playing opponent and myself are 
presumably members of the same scientific community and the theories we jointly 
accept make his chess playing predictable—he knows the theory while I accept his 
authority with respect to knowing it and judge his play predictable, even if not by me. 
This serves to reinforce the point that the ‘availability’ to me of a theory, or of a 
prediction function, is not a matter of what’s in my head, but rather of what theories 
count as normative for my judgements, given the kind of person I am and the kind of 
community I inhabit. One could, of course, define a concept of ‘personal 
unpredictability’, to capture those uses of the term ‘unpredictable’ that reflect the 
ignorance and incapacity of a particular individual. But—and this merely underscores 
the importance of the communitarian concept—such a personal unpredictability 
would have little or no claim to capture the central uses of the term ‘unpredictable’, 
nor any further useful application in the analysis of randomness or other concepts. 
A third response also undermines the claim that this chess player’s moves are 
unpredictable. For this is exactly the kind of situation where one might be frequently 
surprised by the moves that are made, but one can in retrospect assimilate them to an 
account of the opponent’s strategy. That is, while playing I operated with a theory 
which was not sufficient to make accurate predictions concerning my opponent’s 
behaviour; in retrospect, and upon due consideration of his play, I can come to 
develop my understanding of that play, and hence develop better accounts of the 
nature of his chess playing. I can then realise that his behaviour was not random, 
though it may have appeared random at that time. Moreover, it may have been 
(internally) epistemically acceptable for me at the time to judge his behaviour as 
random (setting aside for the time being the preceding two responses), though in 
retrospect I can see that I had no robust external warrant for that judgement. 
This last response illustrates a point that may not have been clear from the 
foregoing discussion: no mention was made, in the definition or its glosses, of any 
temporal conditions on the appropriateness of predictive theories for agents. That is, 
randomness is relative to the best theory of some phenomenon, where which theory 
counts as best is partially dictated by the cognitive and pragmatic parameters 
appropriate for some community of agents. It does not, therefore, depend on whether 
those agents are actually in possession of that theory. Obviously it would be 
inappropriate to criticise past predictors on the grounds that they made internally 
warranted judgements of randomness that were false by the lights of theories we 
currently possess. On the other hand, it is true that they would deserve censure had it 
been the case that they were in possession of the best theory of some phenomenon, 
and had made judgements of predictability which were at variance with that theory. 
That is the sense in which theory-relative judgements of predictability are supposed to 
be normative for agents of the kind in question. As such, it is clear that contingencies 
of ignorance shouldn’t lead us to count something as random; it is a kind of 
(pragmatically/cognitively/theoretically) necessary lack of predictive power which 
makes an event random. To turn back to the post facto analysis of my opponent’s 
play: while playing I made a (perhaps) warranted judgement that it was random. But 
that judgement was at best preliminary and defeasible, for it is clear that it would be 
in principle possible for me to come to possess (or to defer to an expert’s possession 
of) a good predictive theory of that play, and hence to recognise the sense behind 
what appeared wrongly to be random play. By contrast, events that are genuinely 
random do not contribute in this way further illumination of the process of which they 
are outcomes: no after the fact analysis of a random event will make greater 
predictive power available to me or my epistemic brethren. In one sense this is a 
simple corollary of the fact that the Bernoulli process is the paradigm random process, 
and outcomes in such a process are probabilistically, and hence predictively, 
independent. But in another it provides an important illustration of the application of 
the definition of randomness—judgements of randomness can be incorrect though 
warranted, and outcomes of such a process may well serve as evidence undermining 
the warrant for the judgement.37 
 
6.2 Randomness and Probability 
 
One may be wondering what kind of interpretation of probability goes into the 
definition.38 Obviously, credences play a central role in attributions of randomness, as 
it is only by way of updating credences that theories yield actual predictions. As such, 
as long as an agent has credences that could be rationally updated in accordance with 
the best theory for the community of which that agent is a member—that is, whose 
credence function is suitably deferential to expert credence functions (van Fraassen, 
[1989], §§8.4–8.5)—we have the minimum necessary ingredients for potentially 
correct judgements of randomness. Actual judgements of randomness approach 
correctness as the actual updating of credences more closely approximates the 
updating that would be licensed by possession of the best theory. However, there is a 
further question concerning whether there are other kinds of objective probabilities 
(‘chances’) which are disclosed by the theories in question and count as normative for 
the credences of the predictor, via something like the Principal Principle (Lewis, 
[1980]). I hope that the account is neutral on this important issue, and I hope that, no 
matter which account (if any) turns out to be correct, it can simply be slotted into this 
interpretation of randomness. 
In fact, the only requirement that my account of randomness makes on an 
interpretation of probability is that an account must be given of the content of 
probabilistic models in scientific theories. That is, the interpretation must explain 
what feature of objective probability allows it to influence credence, and to shape 
expectations concerning the way the world will turn out, given that all the agent does 
is accept some theory which features probabilistic models.39 Most naturally it might 
be thought that an objective account of probability could meet this demand, but 
subjectivist accounts must also be able to do so, although perhaps less easily. Perhaps 
the only account that the view is not compatible with is von Mises’ original frequency 
view: since he includes randomness as part of the definition of probability, on pain of 
circularity he cannot use this definition of randomness, which already mentions 
probability. 
Von Mises’ discussion of randomness was motivated by his desire to find firm 
grounds for the applicability of probability to empirical phenomena. I completely 
agree: random phenomena are frequently characterised by the fact that they can 
typically be given robust probabilistic explanations, particularly in terms of the 
probabilistic independence of certain events and certain initial data. But even if the 
grounds we have for applying probabilistic theories lie in our own cognitive 
incapacities, that does not hold for the probabilities postulated by those theories. Just 
because predictability is partially epistemic, and hence randomness is partially 
epistemic, doesn’t mean that the probability governing the distribution of predictions 
is epistemic. So our cognitive capacities and pragmatic demands lead to the suitability 
of treating phenomena as random, that is, modelling them probabilistically. Our 
epistemic account of randomness therefore provides a robust and novel explanation of 
the applicability of probabilistic theories even in deterministic cases, without having 
to mount the difficult argument that there are objective chances in deterministic 
worlds, and without sacrificing the objectivity of genuine probability assignments by 
adopting a wholesale subjectivist approach to probability. Randomness then has 
important metaphysical consequences for the understanding of chance, as well as 
being internally important to the project of understanding scientific theories that use 
the concept. Our epistemic stance mandates the use of probabilistic theories; the 
connection between the probabilities in those theories, and the credences implicit in 
our epistemic states, is by no means direct and straightforward. 
 
6.3 Subjectivity and Context-Sensitivity of Randomness 
 
I have emphasised repeatedly that predictability is in part dependent on the properties 
of predictors. What one epistemic agent can predict, another with different capacities 
and different theories may not be able to predict. Laplacean gods presumably have 
more powerful predictive abilities than we do; perhaps for such gods, nothing is 
random. Or consider a fungus, with quite limited representational capacities and 
hence limited predictive abilities. Almost everything is random for the fungus; it 
evolved merely to respond to external stimuli, rather than to predict and anticipate. It 
may appear, then, that judgements of predictability, and hence of randomness, must 
be to some extent subjective and context-sensitive. There is a worry that this 
subjectivity may seem counterintuitive. It may also seem quite worrying that a 
subjective concept may play a role in successful scientific theorising. I wish now to 
defuse these worries. 
Firstly, it is a consequence of our remarks in §6.1 that two epistemic agents 
cannot reasonably differ merely over whether some process is unpredictable or 
random. If they rationally disagree over the predictability of some phenomenon, they 
must be members of different epistemic communities, in virtue of adopting different 
theories or having different epistemic capacities or pragmatic goals. It should be quite 
unexceptional that agents who differ in their broader theoretical or practical 
orientation may differ also in their judgements of the predictability of some particular 
process. 
Secondly, there will be reasonably straightforward empirical tests of the 
predictive powers of that predictor who claims the process is not random. This 
disagreement will then be resolved if one takes these empirical results to indicate 
which theory more correctly describes the world, and which therefore deserves to be 
adopted as the best predictive theory. 
Given these qualifications, it might seem misleading to label the present 
account ‘subjective’.40 For, given values for the parameters of precision of 
observations and required accuracy of computations, and given a background theory, 
whether a process is predictable or not follows immediately. When we recognise that 
these parameter values do not vary freely and without constraint from agent to agent, 
but are subject to norms fixed by the communities of which agents are a part, it seems 
that rational agents can’t easily disagree over randomness, and that purely personal 
and subjective features of those agents do not play a significant role in judgements of 
randomness. It does not seem quite right to call predictability ‘subjective’ simply 
because agents with opposed epistemic abilities and commitments may reasonably 
disagree over its applicability. And insofar as we remain content to classify 
predictability as subjective, these observations make it clear that it is a quite unusual 
form of subjectivity, for randomness and predictability are clearly not applied on a 
purely personal basis, arbitrarily and without rational constraint, and as such are 
capable of having further scientific significance. 
But in this sense few concepts are truly subjective. Like other folk monadic 
properties, randomness can be analysed as a relation with the other terms fixed 
contextually. Consider so-called ‘subjective probability’, which can be analysed either 
as a subjective property of events, or as grounded in an objective relation between an 
event and an agent with certain objective behavioural dispositions. In the case of 
predictability and randomness, it is features and capacities of the predictor that fill in 
the ‘missing’ places of the relation. Given that, it is a matter of choice whether we 
decide to analyse the term as a predicate with subjective aspects, or as a relation. I 
would be inclined to claim that randomness is a partially (inter-)subjective property, 
simply to make clear where my proposal might fall in a taxonomy of analyses of 
randomness, but nothing of significance really turns on this. In a similar fashion we 
typically use the standard subjective analysis of probability, in order to make the 
semantics go more smoothly and to make the connection with past uses of the term 
clearer. 
The context sensitivity of randomness is more intriguing. Here the possibility 
arises that, in a given context, the relevant theoretical possibilities are delimited by a 
theory that in other contexts would be repudiated as inadequate. There are, I have 
argued (§4.3), contexts where thermodynamic reasoning is appropriate, even though 
that theory is false. In such contexts, therefore, a judgement of randomness may be 
appropriate, even though the phenomenon in question might be predictable using 
another theory. Perhaps when stated so baldly the context-sensitivity of randomness 
might seem implausible. However, randomness and predictability are only context 
sensitive in virtue of the fact that theory-acceptance is very plausibly context 
sensitive. As such, no special problem of context sensitivity arises for randomness 
that is not shared with other theory-dependent concepts. Furthermore, the natural 
alternative would be an invariantist account of randomness. Such an account would 
not be adequate, primarily because one would have to give a theory-independent 
account of randomness, and this would be manifestly inadequate to explain how the 
concept is used in diverse branches of scientific practice (§1). 
For instance, in statistical testing we frequently wish to design random 
sequences so that they pass a selected set of statistical tests. In effect, we wish to use 
an effectively predictable phenomenon to produce sequences which mimic natural 
unpredictability by being selective about which resources (which statistical tests) we 
shall allow the predicting agents to use. Dembski ([1991]) sees a fundamental split 
here between a deterministic pseudo-randomness and genuine randomness. I reject 
this split: accepting it would involve a significant distortion of the conceptual 
continuity between randomness in deterministic theories and randomness in 
indeterministic theories. We certainly wish to explicitly characterise some ordered 
and regular outcome sequences as those a genuinely random process should avoid. 
But in selectively excluding certain non-random sequences we do not thereby 
adopt some new notion of ‘pseudo-randomness’ that applies to the sequences that 
remain. Those remaining sequences play precisely the theoretical role that random 
sequences play; in particular, they license exactly the same statistical inferences. 
Better, then, to recognise that the appropriate theory for that phenomenon, in that 
theoretical context, classifies those phenomena as genuinely random. Randomness by 
design, then, is randomness that arises from our adoption of empirically successful 
theories; which is to say, randomness simpliciter. 
 
7 Evaluating the Analysis 
 
I think the preceding section has given an intuitively appealing characterisation of 
randomness. The best argument for the analysis, however, will be if it is able to meet 
the demands we set down at the beginning of §2, and if it is capable of bearing the 
weight of the scientific uses to which it will be put. 
I maintain that unpredictability is perfectly able to support the explanatory 
strategies we examined in §1. In indeterministic situations, phenomena will be 
unpredictable at least partly in virtue of that indeterminism. Randomness therefore 
shares in whatever explanatory power that indeterminism demonstrates in those cases. 
In deterministic cases, our account of the explanatory success of randomness must 
ultimately rest on something else, such as the pragmatic or epistemic features of 
agents who accept the probabilistic theories. Note that the proximate explanation of 
the explanatory success of randomness, deriving from unpredictability, remains 
unified across both the deterministic and indeterministic situations—a desirable 
feature of my proposal. Our cognitive capacities are such that, in many cases, 
prediction of some phenomenon can only be achieved by exceedingly subtle and 
devious means. As such, these phenomena are best treated as a random input to the 
system. The fact that these models are borne out empirically vindicates our 
methodology; for example, we didn’t have to show that rainfall was genuinely 
completely ontically undetermined in order to do good science about the phenomenon 
in question. This is similarly the case with random mating, weather prediction, noise 
and error correction, and coin tossing. In random sampling (and game theory), we 
merely need to use processes unpredictable by our opponents or by the experimental 
subjects to get the full benefits of the statistical inference: if they are forced to treat 
the process as random, then any skill they demonstrate in responding to that process 
must be due to purely intrinsic features of the trials to which they are responding. 
The defining feature of the scientific theories at which we looked in §1 is the 
presence of exact and robust statistical information despite ignorance about the 
precise constitution of the individual events. Rainfall events have a definite 
probability distribution, but precisely when and where it rains is random. If this is the 
hallmark of random phenomena, then we can easily see why the particular 
probabilistic version of unpredictability we used to define randomness is appropriate. 
Indeed, in paradigm cases, unpredictability (and hence randomness) involves the 
probabilistic independence of some predicted event and the events which constitute 
the resources for the prediction. In such cases, one can easily see how the inferential 
strategies we have identified are legitimate. With respect to random sampling, it is the 
probabilistic independence of the choice of test subjects from the choice of test 
regimes that allows for the application of significance tests on experimentally 
uncovered correlations. In the case of random mating, the fact that mating partner 
choice is probabilistically independent of the genetic endowment of that partner that 
allows the standard Hardy-Weinberg law to apply. It is relaxation of this 
independence requirement that makes for non-random mating. This probabilistic 
aspect of randomness and unpredictability is crucial to understanding the typical form 
of random processes and their role in understanding objective probability assignments 
by theories. 
How does our analysis of randomness as unpredictability do on our four 
demands (§2)? 
 
1. Statistical Testing Sequences that are unpredictable to an agent can be effectively 
produced, since those sequences do not need to have some known genuine  
indeterminacy in their means of production in order to ground the statistical 
inferences we make using them. Subjecting the process to a finite battery of 
statistical tests  designed to weed out sequences that are predictable by standard 
human subjects is, while difficult, nevertheless possible. Correlations between the 
test subjects and the random sequence can still occur by chance, but since there 
can be no a priori guarantee  that could ever rule out accidental correlations even 
in the case of genuinely indeterministic sequences, no account of randomness 
should wish to eliminate the possibility. We should only rule out predictable 
sources of correlation other than the one we wish to investigate. 
 
2. Finite Randomness Single events, as well as finite processes, can be 
unpredictable. 
 
3. Explanation and Confirmation A probabilistic theory which classifies some 
process as random is, as a whole, amenable to incremental confirmation (Howson 
& Urbach, [1993], ch. 14). Moreover a particular statistical hypothesis which 
states that the process has a unpredictable character can also be incrementally 
confirmed or disconfirmed, as the evidence is more or less characteristic of an 
unpredictable process. A special case is when the phenomenon is predicted better 
than chance; this would be strongly disconfirmatory of randomness. When 
confirmed, there seems no reason why such theories or hypotheses cannot also 
possess whatever features make for good explanations; they can surely form part 
of excellent statistical explanations for why the processes exhibit the character 
they do. We have gone to some lengths above to show that unpredictability can 
fill in quite adequately for randomness in typical uses; there seems no reason why 
it could not effectively substitute in explanations as well. 
 
4. Determinism Unpredictability occurs for many reasons independent of 
indeterminism, and is compatible with determinism. Thus we can still have 
random sequences in deterministic situations, and as part of theories that 
supervene on deterministic theories. The key to explaining why randomness and 
indeterminism seem closely linked is that the theories themselves should not be 
deterministic, even if they are acceptable accounts of ontically deterministic 
situations. 
 
Analysing randomness as unpredictability, I maintain, gives us the features 
that the intuitive concept demands, without sacrificing its scientific applicability. It 
certainly does better than its rivals; even without them, it captures enough of our 
intuitions to truly deserve the name. The final, and most demanding test would be to 
see how the account works in particular cases: how, for example, to cash out the 
hypothesis that the mate of a female Cambrian trilobite was chosen at random from 
among the male members of her population.41 In outline, my proposal is that a correct 
account of trilobite mating would show that there is no way for us to predict 
(retrodict) better than chance which mate would be (was) chosen, when knowledge 
concerning the male individuals is restricted to their heritable properties (which of 
course are the significant ones in a genetic context). This entails that there is no 
probabilistic dependence between possession of a certain phenotype and success in 
mating. (Of course, given extra knowledge, such as the knowledge concerning which 
male actually did succeed in mating with this individual, or given facts about location 
or opportunity, we can predict better than chance which male would be successful; 
these properties are not genetic, and do not conflict with the assumption of random 
mating.) This account of how to apply the theory must remain a sketch, but I hope it is 
clear how the proposal might apply to other cases. 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                
1 Another example is more recent: ‘we say that an event is random if there is no way 
to predict its occurrence with certainty’ (Frigg, [2004], p. 430). 
2 Thanks to Steven French for emphasising the importance of these motivating 
remarks. 
3 This is unlike the random mating example (§1.2), where we have deterministic 
transitions between probabilistically characterised states. 
4 These are modelled by a Poisson distribution over times between rainfall events, and 
an exponential probability density function over volumes of rainfall. 
                                                                                                                                      
5 Strevens ([2003]) is a wonderful survey of the way that probabilistic order can 
emerge out of the complexity of microscopic systems. 
6 For details, see Albert ([1992]), Hughes ([1989]). 
7 The law relates genotype distribution in the offspring generation to allele 
distribution in the parents. 
8 See also Howson ([2000], pp. 48–51) and Mayo ([1996]). The question whether 
Bayesian statistics should also use randomisation is addressed by Howson & Urbach 
([1993], pp. 260–74). One plausible idea is that if Bayesians have priors that rule out 
bizarre sources of correlation, and randomising rules out more homely sources of 
correlation, then the posterior after the experiment has run is reliable. 
9 Thanks to Spencer Maughan for the example. 
10 Consider some statistical test such as the ! 2  test. The probability arising out of the 
test is the probability that chance alone could account for the divergence between the 
observed results and the hypothesis; namely, the probability that the divergence 
between the observed sequence and the probability hypothesis (the infinite sequence) 
is not an indication that the classification is incorrect. A random sequence is then one 
that, even given an arbitrarily small probability that chance accounts for the 
divergence, we would not reject the hypothesis. 
11 A comprehensive survey of complexity and the complexity-based approach to 
randomness is Li & Vitanyi ([1997]). See also Kolmogorov & Uspensky ([1988]), 
Kolmogorov ([1963]), Batterman & White ([1996]), Chaitin ([1975]), van Lambalgen 
([1995]), Earman ([1986], ch. VIII), Smith ([1998], ch. 9), Suppes ([1984], pp. 25–
33). 
12 Though problems remain. The mere fact that we can give results about the 
robustness of complexity results (namely, that lots of universal machines will give 
roughly the same complexity value to any given sequence) doesn’t really get around 
the problem that any particular machine may well be biased with respect to some 
particular sequence (Hellman, [1978]; Smith, [1998]). 
13 A related approach is the so-called ‘time-complexity’ view of randomness, where it 
is not the space occupied by the programme, but rather the time it takes to compute its 
output given its input. Sequences are time-random just in case the time taken to 
compute the algorithm and output the sequence is greater than polynomial in the size 
of the input. Equivalently, a sequence is time-random just when all polynomial time 
algorithms fail to distinguish the putative random string from a real random string 
(equivalent because a natural way of distinguishing random from pseudo-random is 
by computing the function) (Dembski, [1991], p. 84). 
14 For instance, Brudno’s theorem establishes a connection between KCS-randomness 
and what is known as Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy, which has very recently been given 
an important role in detecting randomness in chaotic systems. See Frigg ([2004], esp. 
p. 430). 
15 There are also difficulties in extending the notion to infinite sequences, but I 
consider these far less worrisome in application (Smith, [1998], pp. 156–7). 
16 There does not exist an algorithm which on input k yields a KCS-random sequence 
S as output such that S = k , nor does there exist an algorithm which on input S yields 
output 1 iff that sequence is KCS-random (van Lambalgen, [1995], pp. 10–1). This 
result is a fairly immediate corollary of the unsolvability of the halting problem for 
Turing machines. 
17 There is some psychological research which seems to indicate that humans judge 
randomness of sequences by trying to assimilate them to representative outcomes of 
                                                                                                                                      
random processes. Any product-first conception of randomness will have difficulty 
explaining this clearly deep-rooted intuition (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, [2001]). 
18 Some complications are induced if one attempts to give this kind of account for 
relativistic theories without a unique time ordering, but these are inessential for our 
purposes (van Fraassen, [1989]). 
19 There are also purported proofs of the compatibility of randomness and 
indeterminism (Humphreys, [1978]). I don’t think that the analysis of randomness 
utilised in these formal proofs is adequate, so I place little importance on these 
constructions. 
20 John Burgess suggested the possibility of this response to me—and pointed out that 
some remarks below (particularly §§4.3 and 6.3) might seem to support it. 
21 An infamous example of this is the bastardised notion of ‘epistemological 
determinism’, as used by Popper ([1982])—which is no form of indeterminism at all. 
The unfortunately named distinction between ‘deterministic’ and ‘statistical’ 
hypotheses, actually a distinction concerning the predictions made by theories, is 
another example of this persistent confusion (Howson, [2000], pp. 102–3). 
22 For more on this, see Bishop ([2003]), Earman ([1986], ch. 1), Schurz ([1995]), 
Stone ([1989]). 
23 Note that, frequently, specification of the past macroscopic history of a system 
together with it present macrostate, will help to make its present microstate more 
precise. This is because the past history can indicate something about the bundle of 
trajectories upon which the system might be. These trajectories may not include every 
point compatible with the currently observed state. In what follows, we will consider 
the use of this historical constraint to operate to give a more precise characterisation 
of the current state, rather than explicitly considering it. 
24 We can also use shadowing theorems (Smith, [1998], pp. 58–60), and knowledge of 
chaotic parameter values. 
25 A perfect, deterministic prediction is the degenerate case where the probability 
distribution is concentrated on a single state (or a single cell of a partition). 
26 I thank Adam Elga for discussion of this point. 
27 As Hans Halvorson pointed out to me. 
28 For a start, see Jeffrey ([2004]), especially ch. 4. 
29 Note, in passing, that this definition does not make biased sequences any more 
predictable than unbiased ones, just because some outcome turns up more often. 
Unpredictability has to do with our expectations; and in cases of a biased coin we do 
expect more heads than tails, for example. We still can’t tell what the next toss will be 
to any greater precision than the bias we might have deduced; hence it remains 
unpredictable. 
30 To connect up with our previous discussions, a sequence of outcomes is random 
just in case those outcomes are the outcomes of a random process. This is perfectly 
compatible with those outcomes being a very regular sequence; it is merely unlikely 
to be such a sequence. 
31 At this point, it is worth addressing a putative counterexample raised by Andy 
Egan. A process with only one possible outcome is random on my account: there is 
only one event (one cell in the partition), which gets probability one, which is the 
same as its unconditional probability. It also counts as predictable, because all of the 
probability measure is concentrated on the one possible state. I am perfectly happy 
with accepting this as an obviously degenerate and unimportant case; recall the 
discussion of the trivial prediction function above (§4.4). If a fix is nevertheless 
                                                                                                                                      
thought to be necessary, I would opt simply to require two possible outcomes for 
random processes; this doesn’t seem ad hoc, and is explicitly included in the 
definition of unpredictability. 
32 Compare the hierarchic of ergodic properties in statistical mechanics, where the 
increasing strength of the ergodic, mixing, and Bernoulli conditions serves to shorten 
the intervals after which each type of system yields random future events given past 
events (Sklar, [1993], pp. 235–40). 
33 Further evidence for this claim is provided by the fact that probabilistic 
independence is an all-or-nothing matter; and taking this as the definition of 
randomness would have the unfortunate effect of misclassifying partially 
unpredictable processes as not random. 
34 Is there ever randomness without probabilistic order? Perhaps in Earman’s space 
invader case, it is implausible to think that any prior probability for the space invasion 
is reasonable—not even a zero prior. The event should be completely unexpected, and 
should not even be included in models of the theory. This would correspond to the 
event in question not even being part of the partition that the prediction function 
yields a distribution over. This, as it stands, would be a counterexample to my 
analysis, since that analysis requires a probability distribution over outcomes, and if 
there is no distribution, the event is trivially not random. I think we can amend the 
definition so as to capture this case; add a clause to the definition of predictability 
requiring there to be some prediction function which takes the event into 
consideration. 
35 This illuminates the common ground my proposal shares with Martin-Löf’s 
statistical testing view of randomness. If we take the patterns to be provided by some 
potentially predictive theory, then failing statistical tests is equivalent to being 
unpredictable with respect to that theory. For the theory provides no resources to 
reject the hypothesis that the only structure governing the sequence is pure chance. 
But a potentially predictive theory will not have infinitely many concurrent 
predictions for a single predictor or group of predictors; so no theory can provide the 
resources for full Martin-Löf randomness and still remain predictive, except to 
creatures with computational abilities quite unlike our own. Nevertheless the spirit of 
the statistical test proposal remains, yet relativised to a set of statistical tests that can 
be actually applied to yield substantive information about the genesis and behaviour 
of a random process. 
36 Of course, if agents know their epistemic limitations, they may know of 
deterministic theories which can correctly account for the phenomena, but the use of 
which lies outside their capabilities. That is just one additional reason why 
randomness can correctly be assigned even in cases of perfect determinism. 
37 Williamson’s example does point to a difficulty, however. Consider the hypothesis 
that our world is run by an omnipotent and completely rational deity, whose motives 
and reasons are quite beyond our ken, and hence our world appears quite capricious 
and arbitrary. If we accept such a theory, we must accept both that (i) the events in the 
world have reason and purpose behind them, being the outcomes of a process of 
rational deliberation by a reasonable agent; and (ii) that the best theory of such events 
that we might ever possess will classify them as random. This seems to me a genuine 
problem (though there is some question about its significance). One way around it 
might be to simply add a condition to the definition that, if the event in question is the 
outcome of some process of rational deliberation, it cannot be random, no matter how 
unpredictable it is. This proposal seems to avoid the problem only by stipulation. I 
                                                                                                                                      
prefer, therefore, to suggest that any event which can be rationalised (as the act of a 
recognisably rational agent) will be predictable; and that therefore if this deity’s 
actions are genuinely unpredictable, they are not rationalisable, and I propose cannot 
be seen as purposive in the way required for the example to have any force. 
38 Dorothy Edgington urged me to address this concern. 
39 Such a demand is tantamount to requiring the interpretation of probability be able to 
answer what van Fraassen ([1989], p. 81) calls the ‘fundamental question about 
chance’, which I take to be an uncontroversial but difficult standard to meet. 
40 John Burgess made this point. 
41 I owe the question, and the illustrative example, to John Burgess. 
